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TURBULENT WATERS IN THREE PARTS 




While scientific accounts of ocean dynamics draw public attention to the turbulence of earthly matter, 
the science alone tells a truncated story. The ocean’s turbulent materiality is more than material: 
practices of scientific knowledge and historically embedded meanings and metaphors also constitute 
how we know, understand, and attempt to govern ocean and land alike. Indeed, planetary ocean 
science is always located within a history and politics, embedded within Western epistemic structures 
and tied to extraction and colonialism. Additionally, as ocean ecologies and human food systems are 
recognized as ever more fragile and as the ocean increasingly is understood as “up for grabs” as a 
site of investment, extraction, and production, there is much at stake in how and where we locate 
the turbulence of marine systems.  
In this essay, we invite turbulence into our writing practices by bringing together three 
perspectives on the complex relationship between metaphor and materiality with regard to oceanic 
worlds. Each co-author writes on the ocean from a different perspective: the lines and laws of the 
ocean (Steinberg); the governance and epistemic cultures of ocean life (Johnson); and practices of 
marine historical knowledge production (Lehman). Throughout this essay we experiment with 
bringing those perspectives together to consider how turbulence matters differently when read 
through different lineages of theory and ocean scholarship: How do legal infrastructures, scientific 
apparatuses, human histories, and marine lifeforms tell different stories of the ocean and its 
processes? We further consider how thinking across our different projects might bring to light not 
only the turbulence of ocean matter, but also practices of knowledge production and meaning as we 
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Introducing turbulence 
Scholarship on oceans in social sciences and humanities has proliferated over the past two decades.1 
It seems, perhaps, that no concept more accurately encapsulates both the impetus and result of this 
turn to the sea than that of turbulence. The turbulence of the ocean’s materiality has become 
increasingly apparent due to extreme weather, changes to ocean life, and shifting ocean circulation 
patterns. At the same time, turbulence suggests the difference that the ocean makes to some of the 
land-based foundational principles that underpin social analysis, including nature, society, humanity, and 
space. In this essay, we offer three different considerations of turbulence as it relates to the matter 
and metaphors of new ocean scholarship.  
 As the articles in this special issue illustrate, matter suggests metaphor, and metaphors 
matter. Turning away from the land that so often ‘grounds’ our metaphors, matter and metaphor 
significantly shape the worlding of the ocean and the ‘oceaning’ of the world. Each of us is a 
geographer who has, at different registers, engaged for the past several years with oceanic matters. 
Jessica Lehman examines how history can be read in and through engagement with marine processes 
for different futures. Philip Steinberg studies the materiality of ocean space and how it shapes legal 
and political frameworks at sea and beyond. Elizabeth Johnson queries epistemologies and 
economies of nonhuman marine life and what they can tell us about contemporary environmental 
politics. In plying lines between matter and metaphor, we are collectively compelled to equally 
account for how we produce structures of knowledge and governance about it. Even more, we are 
attentive to the ongoing and iterative relationships between matter and metaphor, nature and 
knowledge, law and liminality, none of them being simply one-way processes of capture.  
 In the following interventions on matter and metaphor in and with the ocean, we home in on 
the concept of turbulence. Turbulence has been defined by the International Science Council’s 
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components of velocity and vorticity is irregularly and aperiodically distributed in both space and 
time.”2 However, this definition is itself turbulent. Since the rise of modern oceanography in the 
mid-19th century, scientific understandings of turbulence have ranged from broad recognition of 
complex oceanic mobilities to more precise statistical measures of the forces and processes that 
underpin oceanic mixing.3 Turbulence conjures notions of change, motion, and chaos. This is indeed 
part of why it is so compelling to scholars of the sea. However, it also has been taken up by critical 
theorists who have engaged the concept of oceanic turbulence to highlight “a dynamic pattern of 
repetition and reformation that provides stability and texture in an environment of underlying 
instability.”4 It is testament to the evolving complexity of academic work on the marine world that, 
in our individual interventions that follow as well as in our broader bodies of work, we each caution 
against understanding ocean turbulence as simply unmediated, constant flux. While the ocean’s 
unique materialities deserve attention, they cannot be simply counterposed to those on land, and 
ocean turbulence cannot be simply understood as the opposite of the stability of land (which itself is 
of course an illusion). Rather, we note the ways in which patterns adhere in and emerge from 
turbulence, and the ways that turbulence itself is transformed across different registers, scales, and 
types of matter, raising the specter of radical indeterminacy.  
 Despite these cautions, or maybe even because of them, we find turbulence interesting and 
productive to think with and reshape as a matterphorical concept, just as we are compelled to produce 
better engagements with the ocean’s turbulent matter. Indeed, turbulence can also refer to the 
meeting and intersection of ideas, including in the collaborative practice that has given rise to this 
intervention. More than an overarching theory or structuring concept, then, we each find that 
turbulence suggests a set of questions. These questions are best thought through in specific places 
and cases even as they suggest networks that jump scales, stretching across spatial, temporal, and 
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and bodies—even as they make and mark movement. Turbulence itself evolves as a concept 
throughout this collaborative intervention. Some of the questions provoked by our engagement 
include: How does the ocean introduce turbulence into historical narratives? How is turbulence both 
disruptive of and encoded in the legal territorialisation of the ocean? What are the linkages between 
turbulent knowledge and turbulent nature? What does turbulence have to do with the relationship 
between living on and with the sea? At what scales does turbulence matter? And, ultimately, how can 
a turbulent approach to oceanic knowledge teach us about ourselves as (partially) marine creatures? 
 
Turbulent histories • Jessica Lehman 
 
In much of Western scholarship, the ocean has been considered to be outside history and even 
outside time itself. Not simply unchanging, the sea also has been understood as unwritten and 
unwritable, holding no traces of human activity and thus both impossible and uninteresting to ‘read,’ 
except, perhaps, in esoteric scientific disciplines, or as an undifferentiated surface of romantic 
alterity.5 As attention to the ocean has heightened in recent decades, this mythology has been 
challenged by scholars in a range of disciplines. Perhaps most notably, scholars in diverse fields, 
from legal studies to Black feminist theory, work with marine histories to show that an historic 
blindness to the sea has obscured, sometimes intentionally, minor histories of capitalism and 
imperialism.6 Many of these scholars draw on and renew Caribbean scholarship which has long 
resisted European notions of the ocean as the ‘outside’ of history and as inferior to the terrestrial.7 
For scholars of the subaltern, broadly conceived, the ocean has become a referent and resource for 
alternative histories. In this section, I show how thinking history with and through the ocean both 
disrupts hegemonic narratives and poses fundamental challenges to notions of knowledge and 
legibility. Ultimately, marine histories may become stuck between polarized notions of fixity and 
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this impasse, by drawing attention to patterns emergent from chaos and complexity, and moreover 
to the acts of careful attention that refuse binaries between complete knowledge and the 
unknowable. I explore here the implications of understanding turbulence not as that which is 
inherently unknowable but as that which can be partially known; dynamics of movement and 
memory that we are not yet sure if we can know, or to what degree. This at times tentative or halting 
gesture toward knowledge raises ethical and political questions that amplify what engagements with 
marine histories can do.  
Thinking through history with the ocean exposes the falsehoods of linear and teleological 
narratives. Capitalist labor time relies upon a notion of time as rational, linear, and divisible into 
precise units for which one can account. Imperialism adds to this a teleology of progress, even 
beyond economic growth. Yet, Marxist historians, among others, point out that capitalist-imperialist 
modernity is in fact characterized by contradiction, revolution, and rupture.8 Black feminists and 
Native studies scholars would add that these conditions of crisis are spelled out violently on the 
bodies of Black and Native subjects.9 Take for instance the Middle Passage, which brings together 
the brutal contradictions of imperialism and capitalism, at a formative moment for both processes. 
These contradictions, whether between labor power and its suppression under capitalism, or 
between the commodification of enslaved people and their persistence and resistance, are put into 
sharp relief in the space of the sea.  
In this sense, marine histories reveal the ocean as a theatre for processes and events that 
demonstrate the contradictions of capitalist and imperialist modernity. For instance, Cesare Casarino 
analyzes sea narratives in and beyond literary texts to show that “during the emergence and 
consolidation of industrial capitalism, the sea became an increasingly turbulent, contradictory, and 
contested terrain.”10 Even as the oceans have been, and remain, essential spaces for historic and 
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that challenge their totalizing tendencies. Linebaugh and Rediker use the figure of a mythical Hydra 
as a heuristic for the ways in which acts of resistance continually re-emerged from marine spaces of 
the revolutionary Atlantic.11 To give another example, Omise’eke Natasha Tinsley argues for the 
recognition of vital forms of intimacy that emerged from the brutality of the Middle Passage, 
showing that these relations fundamentally challenge the dehumanising violence of slavery and 
create interstices of resistance and belonging.12 Marine histories, if attended to carefully, show the 
violence of capitalism and imperialism as well as their contingency and contradictions. As Elizabeth 
DeLoughrey writes, “Atlantic inscriptions rupture the naturalizing flow of history, foregrounding a 
now-time that registers violence against the wasted lives of modernity in the past and the present.”13 
The ocean’s materiality, however, challenges temporality and legibility in more fundamental 
ways. The ocean’s movements suggest a non-linear time; a temporality that may be cyclical, that may 
drift, that may accrete in unseen ways, that may become stuck or slowed and then rapidly dislodged. 
Indeed, contemporary scholars from a range of disciplines have mined the potentials of 
crosscurrents, shoals, suspension, and submergence, among other phenomena, to disrupt hegemonic 
narratives of history and politics.14 As many of these authors recognize, these features and forces are 
not just metaphorical; their materiality binds Earthly temporalities and historiographical knowledge. 
For example, Tiffany Lethabo King uses the metaphor of the shoal to “interrupt and slow the 
momentum of long-standing and contemporary modes and itineraries for theorizing New World 
violence, social relations, Indigeneity, and Blackness in the Western Hemisphere.”15 At the same 
time, in the histories and literature with which King engages, the shoal serves as a material “place 
and time of liminality” and an “alternative space always in formation,” a hazard for ships, a place to 
rest, a space between land and sea.16 For Astrida Neimanis, the suspension of chemical weapons in 
ocean water should be understood as “not a nonhappening, but a lively, temporal collision, where 
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itself blurs the lines between metaphor and materiality to suggest different ways of understanding 
not simply specific histories but temporal relations themselves. 
  At the same time, the materialities of the ocean call into question the legibility of historical 
traces and the very possibility of narration. Marine materialities, and humans’ incomplete attempts to 
interpret them, are inseparable from the possibilities (and pitfalls) of oceanic histories. The ocean 
cannot be ‘read’ as an archive in the traditional methodology of historical knowledge production; 
nor does it lend itself to notions of stratified geological time popularized in Anthropocene 
narratives. Indeed, it is by examining the differences between conventional ideas of geologic time 
and the geophysical forces of the ocean that Philip Steinberg and Kimberley Peters ultimately argue 
that “the ocean suggests that we think with a different, nonlinear, nonmeasurable notion of time.”18 
Even scientific efforts tailored to producing oceanographic knowledge come up against great 
difficulty. The ocean’s materialities – salinity, temperature, pressure, darkness – defy much of both 
embodied knowledge and technological measurement, to both human and machine sensors.19 When 
the ocean does yield information about its physical nature, it is overwhelmingly found to obey 
nonlinear dynamics, further challenging knowledge and computational capacity on a variety of 
fronts. The methodologies of thinking history through the ocean amplify, certainly not 
unproblematically, a sense of unknowability, that some things are simply lost to the currents of time. 
Neimanis writes, “the sea becomes both a symbol and a material repository for a past without 
definite origin – a past swimming backwards beyond our grasp.”20 
 As Maeve Tynan has pointed out, these two valences of oceanic histories pose a potential 
paradox.21 On one hand, the ocean offers spatial dynamics that suggest alternative narratives of 
capitalism and imperialism. While these histories may have been hidden, perhaps intentionally, they 
frequently suggest a drive toward knowledge and the creation of new and more emancipatory 
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also may be seen as a challenge to historical knowledge production and even the very possibility of 
knowability. The paradoxical relationship between ocean materiality, knowledge, and narrative is 
further interrogated by DeLoughrey, who cautions against tropes of the ocean that reduce it to a 
place of constant motion.22 Rather, she notes, even amidst its churn, the ocean is a space where 
matter and concomitant violence accumulate and ultimately refuse to be washed away.  
DeLoughrey’s caution points to the critique that designating the ocean as a space of radical 
unknowability may be no less perilous than elevating it as a space of structure and knowledge. 
Indeed, there are two specific dangers associated with the designation of the ocean as unknowable. 
First, the declaration that oceanic histories as illegible, unknowable, and ruled by chaos, that is, an 
apparent absence of structure, can serve as an excuse for turning a blind eye to alternate histories of 
capitalism and imperialism, with social and material consequences. The investigation and excavation 
of underwater cultural traces, an expensive and historically piecemeal endeavor, provides an 
instructive example of how this dynamic might unfold. Historically, it was military wrecks and ships 
thought to have been carrying valuable ‘treasure’ that gained significant attention, due alternately to 
national budgets or opportunistic salvage enterprise. As maritime archaeology has shifted to an 
academic discipline in recent decades, many archaeologists have nonetheless “been reluctant to 
engage with what they see as ‘negative’ history, in comparison with the more obvious appeals of 
naval battles, pirate treasure, and sunken cities.”23 Thus, these investigations garner financial 
resources and expertise, and emphasis remains on excess and luxury, conquest, and military might. 
Wrecks that would be more likely to tell explicitly subaltern stories, and stories of capitalism’s 
brutality, such as slave shipwrecks, remain unexplored, and their stories, as painful or ultimately 
liberating as they may be, untold. If we are to accept that these submerged histories are inherently 
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and technological resources to investigations that would tell of capitalist-imperialism’s violences 
rather than its victories. 
In an epistemological sense, too, positing a wide chasm between order and disorder, between 
hegemonic knowledge and the unknowable, reproduces colonial epistemologies that cast the world 
in such binary terms, and that posit ‘unveiling’ and ‘discovery’ as linear and teleological processes. 
Materialist understandings of turbulence suggest a way out of the impasse that is created by a neat 
opposition between disorder and structure, between chaos and knowledge, between stasis and 
movement, or between dominant narratives and resistance. Efforts to grasp turbulence have 
revolutionized the field of oceanography and fluid mechanics. As Monin and Ozmidov write of 
large-scale oceanography projects in the 1970s, “[t]he universally accepted notion of the ocean as a 
nearly stationary system with a pattern of steady-scale gyres had to be replaced by a new conception, 
which admits that most of the energy in the motion of the ocean is contained in vortices having 
various sizes and lifetimes, rather than in the average circulation.”24  
While Western science, including oceanography, inarguably emerges from the same imperial 
structures that construct an ocean separate from society, it also has within it potential for its own 
subversion. One operation of Western science (amongst, of course, other ways of knowing) is to 
refuse a fixed distinction between the knowable and the unknowable. Turbulence, for 
oceanographers and others who study fluid dynamics, does not suggest unknowability, but rather a 
complexity that calls for more careful attention.  This is not to assert, of course, that scientific or 
even materialist understandings should be prioritized over other ways of knowing. Yet in attending 
to these notions of turbulence, one is encouraged to ‘stay with the trouble’ of what is knowable, and 
confront the ethical decisions required by efforts to know.25 Donna Haraway argues that caring for 
human and nonhuman others means becoming implicated in relationships of curiosity, which 
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histories through the sea grows, due in no small part to a non-innocent curiosity about the stories it 
holds, the material specificity and metaphorical power of turbulence can call attention not simply to 
whose narratives are told, but also to how they are told, and to the role of knowledge in the telling.  
For oceanographers, turbulence is characterized by chaos, but also by structure and 
exchange that can be modeled and subjected to statistical analysis. This understanding of turbulence 
as constituting not simply disorder but also re-ordering has been picked up in philosophy by the 
materialist theorists Manuel DeLanda and Michel Serres.27 Geographers Tim Cresswell and Craig 
Martin adopt DeLanda’s and Serres’ interpretations thus: “within eddies of turbulent flows lie highly 
ordered formations. It becomes difficult to discern order from disorder.”28 This point is illustrated 
further in the second component of this intervention, where Philip Steinberg explores the 
delimitations of space and nature that are used to construct the ocean as a space of law.  
 
Turbulent laws • Philip Steinberg 
 
To consider the ocean as turbulence, it is useful to turn to Deleuze and Guattari’s extended 
meditation on the ocean as a space of deterritorialization and reterritorialization.29 In referencing the 
ocean as the “smooth space par excellence,”30 Deleuze and Guattari appear to align themselves with 
other political theorists who have cited the ocean’s physical alterity to explain its position outside 
normative political institutions (most notably, territorial states). One might, for instance, observe a 
resonance between Deleuze and Guattari’s highlighting of the ocean’s “smoothness” and the 
statement by Carl Schmitt that “on the waves there is nothing but waves,”31 a denigration of the 
ocean’s “character” that Schmitt uses to illustrate and explain the ocean’s status as immune to 
inscriptive bordering, and thus to sovereign formations of power. However, as is always the case 
with Deleuze and Guattari’s neologisms, the ocean’s “smoothness” – its resistance to inscription 
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basic level, even if the ocean is “nothing but waves,” these waves are hardly “smooth.” Waves are 
differentiated and generic, they are repetitive yet ever changing, they are associated with both 
separation and connection, in both time and space. Indeed, waves both reflect and produce striation 
as much as they reflect and produce smoothness, and in this sense, waves embody the 
de/reterritorialization of the ocean as a whole. In this light, a number of theorists have likened the 
ocean wave – and, more broadly, the dynamic nature of the ocean as a perpetually mobile space of 
forces, patterns, and chaos – to other vectors and patterns (e.g. soundwaves, earth-atmosphere-
ocean interactions) in an effort to untangle the ocean’s politics and to posit the ocean as a space for 
understanding the wider world.32 
 Despite the growing body of work exploring the ocean as a space of waves (and, more 
broadly, mobilities), less critical attention has been devoted to the ocean as a space of lines.33 Of 
course, just as the wave lacks a singular association with smoothness and deterritorialization, the line 
lacks a singular association with striation and reterritorialization;34 indeed, Deleuze and Guattari 
draw our attention to “lines of flight.”35 Ethnographies and histories of lines drawn in the sea, from 
the Middle Passage36 to modern-day traffic separation schemes,37 illustrate how, just as the putative 
“physical” ocean of waves, volumes, and currents is not simply “smooth”, the putative “social” 
ocean of lines, routes, fishing grounds, and burial grounds is not simply “striated.” This is the larger 
lesson of Deleuze and Guattari’s meditation on the ocean: navigation across the waves requires the 
reduction of the ocean to an abstract (smoothing) set of points, even though this abstraction itself 
involves the construction of a striating grid. Furthermore, the crossing of the ocean, which appears 
to be a realization of the ocean’s smoothness, itself is an act of striation (the marking of routes) 
which facilitates the further striation of the globe (through the projection of power across space and 
time). In other words, it is not that the ocean is “naturally” smooth and that society (unsuccessfully) 
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constructing social order and exerting social power at sea, through smoothing and striation, and in 
the interplay between the two. 
 Although Deleuze and Guattari do not apply the term “turbulence” in their metaphysics of 
de/reterritorialization, it is a particularly evocative concept because of the way that it references not 
just the complex web of ontological and epistemological functions performed by a smoothed and 
striated (and a smoothing and striating) ocean but also the ways in which these tendencies reflect 
and reproduce the ocean’s materiality and the ways in which that materiality is experienced by 
human (and non-human) beings. Thus, a highlighting of turbulence ensures that, even as we turn to 
the ocean as a source of metaphor and as an epistemological wedge for upending landed norms (e.g. 
the seeming permanence of land-based places or the seemingly natural boundaries of land-based 
regions or political entities), we also remain cognizant of both the materiality of the ocean and the 
experience of the ocean encounter. Indeed, just as the ocean lies at the turbulent intersection of the 
smooth and the striated, it also lies at the turbulent intersection of the line and the wave, two 
tendencies that themselves lie at the (turbulent) intersection of a turbulent geopolitics and a 
turbulent geophysics. 
 This can be explored further through an investigation of what appears as one of the most 
straightforward features in the contemporary ocean: the legal division of ocean space into seemingly 
clearly delimited zones. International law of the sea textbooks typically begin with a map depicting 
the ocean as divided into both horizontal zones (the territorial sea out to 12 nautical miles, the 
exclusive economic zone out to 200 nautical miles, etc.) and vertical zones (the division of the 
international seabed from the high seas water column).38 These divisions, in turn, rest upon a binary 
and stable boundary between ocean and land (or, in some instances, between ocean and internal 
waters), as demarcated by baselines. This drawing of legally meaningful lines and boundaries appears 
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materiality. Indeed, the act of line-drawing in the ocean at first glance appears as a direct rebuttal to 
Schmitt’s assertion that the ocean is beyond inscription. 
 And yet, as so often happens when one takes a close look at the law, what appears to be a 
simple act of social striation in fact reflects and reproduces turbulent knowledges of turbulent 
natures. Indeed, rather than rationalizing a complex environment, these lines and laws add new 
dimensions of turbulence. To develop this point, the remainder of this section will explore the 
techniques and principles that have evolved over the past sixty years for defining and delimiting the 
continental shelf.  
 The 1958 United Nations Convention on the Continental Shelf defined the “continental 
shelf” as: 
…the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of 
the territorial sea, to a depth of 200 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the 
superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said area.39 
 
This is an exceptionally vague statement for what should be a fundamental definition. The reader 
attempting to apply this definition is left with a number of foundational questions: Must the 
“exploitation” referred to in the article be commercially viable, or is it enough for it to be 
hypothetically (or technically) possible? Do lines need to be redrawn if extractive technologies or 
demand change? How can one operationalize the criterion “outside the area of the territorial sea” 
when the companion Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone40 never identifies 
the territorial sea’s outer limits? Underlying all this uncertainty is the fact that in the 1958 
Convention the continental shelf is defined as a social space (a space that is used in a certain way) 
rather than as a physical space (a space with certain geophysical properties vis-à-vis the state that 




“Matterphorical” • Theory & Event Special Issue • ed. Gandorfer & Ayub 14 
 
 This uncertain definition of the continental shelf is paired with unclear guidance for how the 
boundary between two states’ continental shelves should be delimited. The Convention states that 
“unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary shall be determined 
by application of the principle of equidistance.”41 However, “special circumstances” are never 
defined. 
 Taking advantage of this vague definition of what the continental shelf is as well as the 
Convention’s open-ended invitation to adjust its boundaries in response to “special circumstances,” 
the Federal Republic of Germany appealed to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the 1960s, 
challenging the equidistance lines that otherwise would be drawn in the North Sea. Germany noted 
that the concave shape of the coastline, indented by the Elbe delta, effectively was creating a 
situation where, if normal equidistance lines were applied, the Netherlands and Denmark would 
crowd Germany out of the petroleum rich areas in the central North Sea. In 1969, the International 
Court of Justice largely found in Germany’s favour. In the process, the ICJ introduced several new 
principles into the legal status of the continental shelf and its delimitation.  
 
…delimitation is to be effected by agreement in accordance with equitable principles, and 
taking account of all the relevant circumstances, in such a way as to leave as much as 
possible to each Party all those parts of the continental shelf that constitute a natural 
prolongation of its land territory into and under the sea, without encroachment on the natural 
prolongation of the land territory of the other…[An equitable delimitation requires] a 
reasonable degree of proportionality…between the extent of the continental shelf areas 
appertaining to the coastal State and the length of its coast measured in the general direction 
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 Crucially, with this Judgment, the ICJ effectively redefined the continental shelf as a juridical 
object. Following the ICJ Judgment, the continental shelf is now no longer defined functionally – as 
the area adjacent to a state where a state finds it profitable to engage in resource extraction activities 
– but geo-physically – as “a natural prolongation of [a state’s] land territory.” It is no longer an 
external space used by the state but rather is a fundamental part of the state. It follows from this re-
definition that a state should have the same rights on “its” continental shelf as it has on land, since, 
under international law, “territory” (whether underwater or not) is essential for constituting the 
legitimacy of a state’s sovereignty.43 Other innovations of the ICJ Decision flow from its redefinition 
of the continental shelf as a physical object. Since the continental shelf is a physical (or “natural”) 
feature, and since “nature” is beyond the control of society, it is entirely appropriate to adjust lines 
with a consideration for equity (with proportionality being used as a measure of equity). After all, 
since differential access to the continental shelf is due to “natural” causes (in the case, the shape of 
the coastline), the aggrieved party’s misfortune is simply due to “bad luck” and can be adjusted in 
the interest of equity without fundamentally challenging principles of sovereignty that limit the 
capacity for states to engage in inter-state distributional justice. Additionally, since the continental 
shelf, post-1969, is understood as a “natural prolongation” of a state’s land territory, it makes sense 
that any adjustment to equidistance lines should occur in a way that minimizes encroachment onto 
another state’s “natural prolongation.” As it happened, this interpretation suited Germany 
particularly well because it led to Germany’s additional continental shelf being granted near the 
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Figure 1. North Sea Continental Shelf delimitation. Dashed grey lines depict the delimitation that would have been 
implemented based solely on equidistance principles. Colored zones depict delimitations that were eventually 
implemented, based on equitability principles introduced in the ICJ decision. Copyright: Durham University/IBRU 
 
 The innovations of the ICJ’s decision on the North Sea Continental Shelf case have been 
further specified through case law, and have been maintained in subsequent conventions. Thus, for 
instance, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) advances the definition 
of the continental shelf as a physical object even further, providing a series of technical means for 
defining the shelf and its outer limits.44 This designation of the continental shelf as a distinct, 
bounded object also facilitates the distinction between the seabed from the water column that, in 
turn, underpins UNCLOS’ regime for facilitating seabed mining.45  
 Crucial to this entire story of the evolution of the continental shelf /seabed as a juridical 
object is how laws and lines have been used to extend the logic of state power to a stratum of the 
ocean with newfound political-economic significance. Taking as a given the understanding that a 
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Continental Shelf Judgments through UNCLOS and on to various instances of case law have 
effectively produced a new understanding whereby territory is extended to the seabed, marking the 
seabed less as a stratum of the ocean and more as an extension of land. This naturalization of state 
power, in turn, is facilitated by an extension of the idea, inherited from land, that space is permanent 
and objective (and fundamentally pre-social) and that its control (and its limits) can be enabled 
through a calculative rationality of fixed definitions and determinate limits, a seemingly “dry 
ontology” that diverges sharply from one that might be derived from a consideration of the ocean’s 
physical properties.46 Indeed, in contrast to my proposal (with Kimberley Peters) for theorizing with 
an “excessive” ocean,47 this construction of the continental shelf might well be seen as an example 
of “land in excess.”48 
 At one level, this physical (and social) construction of the ocean, where the categories and 
social affordances of land are imported into ocean space and employed with little regard for the 
ocean’s complex materiality, might be seen as a denial of turbulence. However, the language of 
“denial” is too simple, as is any assertion that the extension of land-based notions of territory to the 
continental shelf simply represent an extension of a “dry ontology” to the sea. For if Deleuze and 
Guattari teach us anything it is that dialectics do not exist as declarations of denial: an act of striation 
is not a refusal of a space’s smoothness so much as it facilitates (and, indeed, embodies) a further 
round of smoothing, in an ongoing relationship of “interdependence,” “simultaneity,” and 
“translation.”49 Thus, to echo Jessica Lehman’s intervention, the turbulence of the ocean exists not 
just in the complexity of its geophysics, as important as this is if we are seeking to build an ontology 
based on oceanic affordances, instabilities, and seepages. It also exists in our (unsuccessful) attempts 
to pin down this geophysics, and it exists in how both the ocean and our categories for 
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Ultimately, the ocean’s turbulence exists in how we both attempt to understand ourselves as, and 
deny our existence as, oceanic creatures. 
 
 
Turbulent lives • Elizabeth R. Johnson 
 
As Philip Steinberg writes above, ocean turbulence exists in how—and perhaps whether— we 
understand ourselves as oceanic creatures. But how might we consider turbulence in relation to 
those oceanic creatures that actually live in the sea? As we note in the introduction, ocean turbulence 
has been most often considered in terms of geophysical properties, including the saltwater pump, 
thermal and fluid dynamics, and the wind patterned repetition of waves. These epistemologies and 
visualizations offer up the turbulence of the sea as a site of dynamism, but they are viewed as 
universal, planetary properties. In exploring the potential for a conversation between geophysically-
inspired and biologically-inspired ocean theorizing I, and indeed the three authors of this article, take 
up Steinberg and Peters’ assertion that “there is ample room for perspectives focused on geophysical 
and biological liveliness to productively cross paths and for conceptual hybrids to emerge.”50 In this 
section, I consider how understandings of turbulence shift when our attention is turned away from 
oceanography to consider marine lives through bio- and ecological sciences. 
 From the view of ecologists and biologists, ocean turbulence is differently animated and often 
more particular than planetary. Consider, for example, how the ocean is transformed when scientists 
turn attention away from the saltwater pump and toward the “whale pump.”51 For much of human 
history, the metabolic demands of whales and other cetaceans have been viewed as a net drain on 
fisheries. Many who make a living off the life of the sea have viewed cetaceans as competitors in a 
zero-sum game of predatory extraction. Associated debates have raged over cetacean culls to limit 
predation on other “lucrative” organisms.52 In 2010, however, biologists Joe Roman and James 
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significance not only to the life, but also to the matter of the seas. Roman and McCarthy followed 
humpbacks as they moved around the Gulf of Maine, collecting samples of the fecal plumes left in 
their wake. Whales, Roman and McCarthy described, dive deep to hunt. But they defecate when 
returning to the surface for air. In doing so, whales move matter, rich with iron and nitrogen, from 
deep to shallow waters. This mixing of matter, Roman and McCarthy argued, promotes the growth 
of phyto- and zooplankton on the surface of the sea. And by expanding this basal trophic later, 
whales produce resources for other organisms with every wasting event. Recent research into whale 
falls—the slow descent of whale carcasses through the layered substrate of the ocean—shows a 
similar pattern of nutrient mixing in the opposite direction: every event of a whale’s passing not only 
feeds organisms across the vertical column, but also creates novel “islands” of diverse life on the sea 
floor.53 This body of ecological literature suggests that, if whales are to be seen within a framework 
of loss and gain, far from draining life in the oceans, they enhance abundance.  
 Paying attention to ocean life through the lens of bio- and eco-scientists bears not only on 
how we understand ocean resources, but how we consider the temporal and geographic relatedness 
of earthly processes. These studies make clear that the kinds and quantities of ocean resources—and 
patterns of ocean turbulence—are unstable, and constantly in flux. They exist in relation to the 
temporal rhythms of metabolic processes, including life, death, and bowel movements.  
 These studies of marine ecology also bring to light unique geographies, suturing specific 
bodies and events to planetary process. While heavily patterned according to seasons and migration 
routes, the ecological networks produced in the wake of whales are particular and emergent. Indeed, 
scientists speculate that each event of a whale fall likely produces singular ecological communities 
and species specific to a single whale carcass. But, as Roman and McCarthy have noted, ocean 
waters and lives circulate. Thinking with marine ecologies therefore encourages meditation on the 
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repository, space, or medium upon and within which human systems of governance overlay and play 
out, the lively ocean is inter- and intra-active. 
 Like zooplankton in a well-fertilized ocean, scholarship on marine life in the humanities and 
social sciences is now in abundance. Research into the science of nonhuman marine organisms 
reveals how slippery and even “alien” elements of life shake up not only the sea and its properties, 
but human relationships to it.54 Critical engagements with marine creatures have picked up on these 
inter (or intra-) connections, raising questions about “life itself” and Enlightenment narratives about 
the role of humans in the universe. But life—marine and terrestrial—is never known by “itself.” 
Rather, it is known through the practices and meaning-makings of knowledge (scientific or 
otherwise). Efforts to engage with marine organisms therefore open up questions of the turbulent 
relationship between matter, life, and language as it emerges in scientific practice. In what follows, I 
trace some of the genealogies that have animated the turn to nonhuman marine science as a matter 
of philosophical importance. I begin by following Steinberg’s account to the work of Deleuze and 
Guattari and their influence on STS and Actor Network Theory. But I also suggest an alternative 
genealogy that extends from Donna Haraway and Karen Barad and toward a meditation not only on 
materiality and life, but also on indeterminacy. Engaging with their work as well as that of Eva 
Hayward and Astrid Schrader, I consider some of the ways that marine life-science requires thinking 
with the radical indeterminacy of these relations in ways that transform how we understand and 
categorise life and its divergent potentials.  
 
Seaward: Toward a Multi-Agential World 
 Like Steinberg’s lines and laws of ocean governance, social science and humanities scholarship 
on the lively ocean carries a debt to the work of Deleuze and his collaborations with Guattari. 
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waves of anti-essentialist scholarship that would highlight impermanent interrelations.55 Beginning in 
the 1980s, Michel Callon, John Law, Annamarie Mol, and Bruno Latour, for example, drew on these 
concepts to systematically repattern sociological research. In doing so, their work has reconfigured 
what matters to socio-political analysis. Rather than histories, global processes, or pre-determined 
hierarchies, their early work looked to the engineers and scientists who created knowledge that 
would condition the material and technological worlds of Europe. Accordingly, they brought 
nonhuman life, technology, and bodies into socio-political analysis. Scallops and the scientists who 
would breed them;56 aircraft and the multiple political and technological histories that built them;57 
bodies and the multiplicity of disease;58 and transportation technologies and the organizational 
networks that failed to bring them into being all animated their early accounts of bio-socio-technical 
worlds.59 
 Following Deleuze’s rejection of essentialism, actor-network theory (ANT) presented actants 
as partial and multiple rather than singular, embedded within the discursive framings into which they 
have been “translated.” Callon’s scallops acted in relation to the assemblages of knowledge, 
technology, and language that constituted them as singular entities: the scallops themselves might 
have been or acted otherwise in a different set of circumstances.60 ANT has also worked to 
demonstrate how modernity’s epistemic perspectives are as much a part of historical fictions and 
ideologies than of material practices. As Latour’s We Have Never Been Modern patiently demonstrates, 
societies have tied themselves ever more tightly to nonhuman natures as scientific knowledge has 
driven a conceptual wedge between nature on one side and technology on the other.61 
Acknowledging and mapping the roles and agencies of nonhumans ostensibly has unsettled the grip 
of those modernist narratives of history. In the decades since ANT’s emergence, attention to the 
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 Of course, ANT has not been immune to the limits of its own linguistic framing. Its 
vocabulary of networks, nodes, translations, hybridities, and actants reflects the techno-scientific 
worlds that its authors have studied. And while it has described assemblages as impermanent and 
ephemeral, its language often suggests something more machinic, particularly when nodes and 
networks are described as static concretizations of moments in time. Even more, in an effort to 
avoid reconstructing metanarratives, its authors have often failed to account for wider historical 
tendencies, transformations, and, indeed, turbulences.  
 
Lively Turbulence, Indeterminate Worlds 
 The work of both Donna Haraway and Karen Barad has created a language of multi-agential 
becoming rooted in livelier matterphors.63 In her interview with Tyrza Nichols Goodeve published 
as How Like a Leaf, Haraway describes bioscience as a discipline riven with tensions between matter 
and metaphor as well as historical conditions and the potential emergence of new forms and 
relations. We live, she writes, both “as and in a biological world,” in which biology is part of a 
discursive and material knot of matter and meaning.64 Haraway’s emphasis on being “as and in” the 
knotty world of life and bioscience also invites scholars to view nonhuman organisms not only as 
actors, but as co-producers of concepts and theoretical interventions (I have followed Haraway’s 
lead here in placing whale bioscience before philosophy in this account of lively matter).  
 Barad’s work similarly weaves together stories and histories of knowledge production with a 
focus not only on life as such, but on the most fundamental elements of matter. For Barad, our 
worlds are the product not of the interaction of language and matter, but the agential and often 
turbulent intra-action of phenomena. Intra-action, central to Barad’s ethico-onto-epistemology of 
agential realism, upends Cartesian understandings of causality based on a “metaphysics of 
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action names the processes in which subjects, objects, apparatuses of knowing, and forces 
collectively materialize—and materialize as “things-in-phenomena.”66 For Barad, phenomena are 
what we might consider conditioned by a kind of turbulence that Barad refers to as “diffraction.” In 
quantum physics, diffraction names the bending of light waves around an object. Diffraction thus 
describes not only the wave properties of light, but also the act of observing light as a wave (and not 
as a particle). Unlike reflection, which attends to the likeness between things, diffraction requires 
acknowledging the entanglement of matter, observer, and apparatus.   
 Following Haraway, Barad adopts diffraction as a metaphor for ethical inquiry.67 This mode of 
inquiry requires recognizing that observable things are the result of what Barad refers to as “agential 
cuts” that give definition to the overlapping and indeterminate edges among things, objects, bodies, 
and their “heterogeneous histories.”68 With connection to Jacques Derrida’s concept of the trace, 
Barad’s agential realism has implications for ethics and politics. Through it, the world is approached 
not as a collection of pre-existing entities to be interpreted by conscious thought, translated into 
language, or ‘given voice’ through prosthetic technologies. Instead, objects, analytic apparatuses, and 
the subjects that analyze and use them are indeterminate in advance of their collective constitution 
through intra-action.  What is object and what is subject is (always) held in question rather than 
predetermined. Such a world demands accountability to those strangers (within) that are absent, 
distant, and past—as well as present—in part because they collectively are “sedimented out of 
particular practices that we have a role in shaping.”69 Thus, agential realism is an ethico-onto-
epistemology.   
 For both Haraway and Barad, an abiding concern has been not only to describe the worlds 
produced through scientific practice, but to understand how those worlds and their discursive 
framings are part of deep tendencies of patriarchy, capitalist enclosures and colonial, Eurocentric 
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thinking “as and in” lifeforms that seem to exist in excess of Enlightenment categories, languages, 
and narratives. And, while Barad’s writings on quantum mechanics effectively demonstrate that 
diffraction is always a “lively affair,” both Barad and Haraway look to oceanic tentacular organisms 
to serve as figures of a more plural—and, indeed, turbulent—worlding. Haraway’s naming of the 
Chthulucene as an alternative to the Anthropocene, for example, suggests a world that is not 
accomplished or settled, but is rather “unfinished” and in a perpetually “troubled” process of 
becoming.71  
 In Barad’s later work, the brittlestar, a relative of the starfish, has become a central figure in 
the articulation of this ethico-onto-epistemological worldview. Studied for its uniquely distributed 
visual system, the brittlestar expresses a morphology in which “being and knowing, materiality and 
intelligibility, substance and form” are intimately entangled.72 In short, the brittlestar “does not 
suffer the Cartesian doubts of an alleged mind-body split.”73 Through its tentacular being, Barad 
understands the relationship between matter and meaning to take place through the body and its 
relationship to the world. Barad returns time and again to the lack of clear limits around bodily 
boundaries: “The ongoing reconfiguring of [the brittlestar’s] bodily boundaries and connectivity are 
intra-active material-discursive practices through which the agential cut between ‘self and ‘other’ (e.g. 
‘surrounding environment’) is differentially enacted.”74 Rather than awaiting humans to render it 
intelligible, the brittlestar and its “inherent indeterminacy of bodily boundaries” articulates itself 
through differentiation within (not only from) its environment. Like Haraway’s Chthulucene, the 
brittlestar figures a world that is unfinished and “always already opening up-to-come.”75 It is a world 
riven with indeterminacy and subject to “the surprise, the interruption, by the stranger (within) re-
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Tentacles Across Abyssal Relations 
 Haraway’s and Barad’s thinking “with and as” marine creatures has extended, tentacularly, to 
others concerned with the diffractive patterns of matter and meaning in the ocean. Stefan 
Helmreich’s Alien Oceans, for example, shows how human life is permeated by other life forms—and 
therefore alien to its very self. Across this work, the matters and metaphors of marine life are deeply 
entwined, spanning geographic locations, bodies, and temporal scales. As Helmreich notes, “life 
these days is being distributed into material and semiotic networks that scale from the fidgeting and 
floating gene to the Gaian globe, with lots of baroque curlicues in between.”77 The lively legacies of 
Haraway’s and Barad’s writings “as and in” marine creatures are perhaps best exemplified in the 
work of two feminist STS scholars who have worked and studied alongside them: Eva Hayward and 
Astrid Schrader. Both carefully work to unravel the implications of thinking with life between 
matter, language, and the political and cultural infrastructures within which these worlds interweave. 
As they do so, both make a crucial intervention in the trajectory of lively more-than-human studies: 
they take readers away from the identification of action and agency to confront the radical 
indeterminacy of living “as and in” marine biology.  
 Hayward’s work has featured the “finger eyes” of cup corals, the pulsating light shows of 
ctenophores, and the regenerative capacities of starfish to animate interstitial spaces between forms 
of flesh, metaphor, meaning, and matter.78 Her essay “More Lessons from a Starfish” begins with 
the lyrics of Antony and the Johnson’s song, “The Cripple and the Starfish.”79 It is a song about 
violence and regeneration. In it, the starfish stands in as a referent to the possibility of renewal after 
injury. The song leads Hayward to a mediation in which the starfish in the song ceases to be merely 
a metaphor and becomes a material and semiotic artifact through which to consider metamorphosis. 
She connects the lyrical starfish to scientific knowledge of starfish capacities for metamorphosis and 
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of lyrical construction, but of decades of scientific inquiry. The language of starfish bodies, of 
metamorphosis and regeneration, are not simply known, but felt: “When I say ‘Starfish,’ or describe 
their lifeways,” Hayward writes, “how do these words retain the presences, properties, and behaviors 
of invertebrates undergoing metamorphosis? Perhaps it is a frivolous desire on my part, even 
ridiculous, to want to understand how words focus our attention, leading us to see/hear/feel 
interactions, requiring us to attend to a perpetual, worldly motion.”80 Through that attention, 
Hayward meditates on the embodied experience of transitioning, highlighting the turbulence of 
bodies, matter, and metaphor, all of which are in the making.  
 Hayward’s work draws on Barad’s notion of diffraction to bridge apparent abysses between 
human and nonhuman bodies as well as matter and metaphor. Perhaps most importantly, however, 
her work highlights the ongoing abyssal conditions produced through metamorphosis. For 
Hayward, gender is not only a troubled category, but a troubled condition, as bodies are, like Barad’s 
brittlestar and Antony and the Johnson’s starfish, not bounded by the limits of flesh, but radically 
indeterminate. By paying attention to the language used to describe their always unfinished 
becomings, Hayward draws her readers’ attention to the relationship between words and worlds in 
recognition of a shared mutuality across oceanic and terrestrial corporealities. Her work shows how 
we—our bodies and those of the starfish—are unsettling as “specific parts of the world’s ongoing 
refiguring”.81 
 Schrader’s work on marine microbes similarly speaks to the radical indeterminacy of life by 
troubling distinctions between individual and population, scientific observer and biological object, 
and life and death.82 Schrader investigates the science of cyanobacteria’s circadian rhythms and 
programmed cell death, or apoptosis. According to scientists, populations of cyanobacteria regulate 
their functions according to the rising and setting of the sun. But their life spans are often shorter 
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populations ‘know’ of the sun’s movements if the individuals within them have never experienced 
the rising and setting of the sun? As Schrader describes it, scientists have concluded that 
cyanobacteria manifest “a memory, a transgenerational communication, or an inheritance”.83 
Attempts to demonstrate this memory, however, confound scientists, as the temporal knowledge of 
time cannot be observed within an individual of the population. This knowledge of the earth’s 
movements, therefore, is seemingly collective. And, as Schrader argues, this is a behavioral 
knowledge that is not only shared among living members of the population, but also by those that 
have passed from it. Drawing on the work of Derrida, Schrader refers to the life-times of marine 
microbes as haunted, a characteristic of being that defies “the opposition between presence and 
non-presence, actuality and in-actuality, life and non-life”.84 For Schrader, the indeterminacy of these 
microbial lives—like the whale falls mentioned above—counters the conception that death is a limit 
to life. Instead, the haunting of marine microbes demonstrates that death is internal to life—and part 
of its ongoing, always unfinished unfolding.85   
 For Schrader, this condition of haunted life is not limited to microbial populations themselves: 
bioscience is also an intimate part of this unfolding. Much like quantum mechanics, “haunted 
microbes exist only with the help of science.”86 Through these scientific descriptions, not only is the 
individuality of cyanobacteria called into question, so too are divisions between laboratory science 
and ocean life as well as microbe and human. This presents a radical undecidability—or, perhaps, 
endless turbulence—between descriptive practice of science and the materiality of ocean life. 
Accordingly, the agencies of life or matter and the agencies of observers are indecipherable. This 
suggests that scientific research and representations neither precede nor follow life, but that they are 
mutually constitutive.  
 As Schrader describes, this indeterminacy has important implications for political norms and 




“Matterphorical” • Theory & Event Special Issue • ed. Gandorfer & Ayub 28 
 
conditions without…requiring autonomy or individuality” disrupts anthropocentric notions of bio-
politics that hold the preservation of autonomous liberal life at their center.87 For her, conditions of 
governance cannot be thought to follow either science or life. Rather, all three must be decided in 
the indeterminate and turbulent space of knowledge production practices.    
 As my initial example of the whale pump suggests, living and thinking “as and in”—rather 
than merely “on or about”—life in the oceans requires more than the accumulation of knowledge. 
As the work of Haraway, Barad, Hayward, and Schrader collectively demonstrates, taking the world 
and ourselves seriously as creatures as and in a state of turbulence requires simultaneously 
recognizing the abyssal gaps between matter and meaning, human and nonhuman, particular and 
planetary, while also acknowledging the radical intimacies and interconnections among and across 
those scales and realms. Schrader refers to this as “abyssal intimacy”.88 It is in these spaces of abyssal 
intimacy that we conjure worlds through matterphorical intervention.  
 
Making sense of turbulence (or not) 
All three contributors to this intervention on the turbulence of oceanic matterphors – and the 
matterphor of oceanic turbulence – have given a privileged place to Deleuzeoguattarian philosophy. 
Steinberg employs Deleuze and Guattari explicitly in his discussion of the smooth and the striated, 
as does Johnson in her discussion of relationality and assemblages. The links to Deleuze and 
Guattari are less explicit in Lehman’s contribution, but she too relies on their thought as she 
employs a non-essentialist sense of the material to question linear narratives. Although this 
theoretical congruency was not by design, it is, in retrospect, not surprising as Delezeoguattarian 
thought is particularly suited for interpreting the concept of turbulence as a relationality between 
matter and metaphor. Even more, turbulence illuminates matterphors’ indeterminacies. Turbulence 




“Matterphorical” • Theory & Event Special Issue • ed. Gandorfer & Ayub 29 
 
the same time, it disrupts smoothness through mixing, churning, and other patterns of movement. 
While we are all three drawn to different elements of Deleuzeoguattarian philosophy, such as 
emphasis on relations rather than essences, notions of immanence, and a methodological 
promiscuity that draws from science, literature, and art, it is perhaps this attention to movements 
between fixity and fluidity, force and disruption, that interests us all most here. Rather than 
understanding turbulence as confounding Deleuze and Guattari’s discussion of smoothness and 
striation, we see it as a way to point out the complexities of their thought and the useful directions a 
more careful reading can indicate.89  
 That said, in the spirit of Deleuze and Guattari, we need to conclude by querying whether our 
focus on a single concept – turbulence – might itself be limiting. After all, any specific focus will 
‘crowd out’ others, no matter how expansively it is positioned. In emphasizing fluidity and 
disruption, we risk losing sight of the material and discursive patterns that persist in spite of 
turbulence. And yet, we find turbulence to be particularly provocative because, even as it challenges 
our understanding of knowledge, chaos, stasis, and mobility, it also challenges our notions of scale. 
Indeed, turbulence prods us to think across, and outside, scale. Historian of science Naomi Oreskes 
has suggested that studying the practices of oceanography entails “scaling up our vision.”90 But even 
more, turbulence is alluring because it permits scale jumping. Turbulence can refer to fluid dynamics 
that occur on the microscale and yet through complex mechanisms influence the world climate. 
Turbulence can also name a defining characteristic of contested and unstable legal and political 
regimes at numerous scales. In short, turbulence upends notions of scale not simply by permitting us 
to trace its effects across scales, but by challenging us to use it as what Gabrielle Hecht has called an 
“interscalar vehicle.”91 That is, we can put the concept to use to make links across scales, revealing 
connections that have real political and material implications but that could not previously be seen. 
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a social and material product, at sea as on land. Hecht writes, “What makes something an interscalar 
vehicle is not its essence but its deployment and uptake, its potential to make political claims, craft 
social relationships, or simply open our imaginations.”92  By engaging in this three-way discussion of 
turbulence, we hope we have opened further conversation of the connections and disconnections 
between matter and metaphor, not simply as they pose potential problems but also as they produce 
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